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Abstract 
 
This study explores entrepreneurial decision-making with respect to ​non-analytic ​and ​analytic           
behaviour among novice and expert entrepreneurs. In order to understand and categorise            
subcomponents, or strategies, of these two styles of decision-making think-aloud protocols were            
used. By exploring and comparing behaviour within various entrepreneurial scenarios, and           
segmenting it using precise categories of cognition, this study adds to existing literature by              
offering more descriptive value to our understanding of entrepreneurial decision-making. In           
doing so, ​it offers insight for novices curious about the thought-processes preceding expert             
entrepreneurs’ decision-making. 
 
Our findings regarding the use of ​non-analytic and ​analytic ​behaviour among these two groups              
of entrepreneurs coincide to an extent with previous research on novices and experts. The results               
regarding what strategies are predominantly used by these two groups offer detailed comparison             
of behaviour. Further large-scale research is proposed using a similar methodology to this study,              
as well as research on the merits of these various strategies. This would allow the formulation of                 
prescriptive guidelines for novices that indicate best practice regarding specific ​analytic ​and            
non​-​analytic ​strategies to decision-making. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Researchers across domains have been curious for years about expert performance. Questions            
like ‘what makes someone an expert?’ or ‘do experts do things differently?’ are common to both                
researchers and practitioners alike in every field. After several decades of research in the subject,               
a somewhat widely held belief is that expertise is something that is gained with time. Deliberate                
practice literature tells us that more than seven years of intentful practice results in the               
accumulation of expertise and lends itself to superior performance in a given domain (Feltovich              
et al., 2006). This idea of expertise is a crucial assumption held by this paper and will be                  
developed further along in this paper. So, expertise is gained with time, but what exactly makes                
experts different? That is a question left for individual domains to decide. 
 
Much like other fields, entrepreneurship researchers have strived to pinpoint characteristics of            
high performing entrepreneurs or expert entrepreneurs. The initial trait approach to discern            
personal characteristics of these entrepreneurs failed to yield positive results over the last several              
decades thus prompting researchers to look towards other avenues; individual behaviour being            
one of them (Baum & Locke, 2004). Unlike the trait approach, this stream has shown promise in                 
recent times with much evidence to show varied decision approaches between expert            
entrepreneurs and non-experts (Dew et al., 2015). For example, Dew et al. (2009) demonstrated              
considerable divergence in the logical framing of expert entrepreneurs when compared to MBA             
students. 
 
A parallel line of study emerged around the same time with similar goals, however pitting novice                
entrepreneurs (individuals without prior business experience) against habitual entrepreneurs         
(multiple business experience). Some of these researchers pointed out that habitual entrepreneurs            
are more likely to employ different decision-making styles in the opportunity-recognition stage            
due to years of deliberate practice (Ucbasaran et al., 2015) while others demonstrated empirical              
evidence to suggest prior business experience contributes to valuable learning (Politis, 2008).            
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Thus, a sentiment linking multiple business experience with expertise also exists in the field              
among researchers (Gustafsson, 2004).  
 
The findings from the above contexts and others have demonstrated the relative success of the               
behavioural approach and as a result makes the case for a deeper look into entrepreneur’s               
cognitive structures to explain the differences among them. One argument being that a cognitive              1
approach allows us to not only look at decision strategies, but also seek the thinking-patterns that                
contribute to their behaviour. The case for taking the cognitive approach in entrepreneurship has              
also been supported by many scholars in the field (Mitchell et al., 2007; Ucbasaran et al., 2015).                 
Authors like Baron (2004) pointed out how other fields like education and psychology have              
reaped the benefits of such an approach and asserted to expect similar results in the field of                 
entrepreneurship.  
 
So, it is known that expertise in entrepreneurship is not linked to a particular personality trait and                 
that entrepreneurs are not homogeneous in this respect. However, evidence does point to             
differences in behaviour among different groups of entrepreneurs . This is especially visible in              
some situations when comparing expert entrepreneurs with those that are not as experienced.             
Scholars have also noted the benefits of taking a cognitive approach in entrepreneurship and              
urged researchers to do so. Keeping these in mind, this research papers adopts a central research                
question pertaining to ​how entrepreneurs make decisions ​and the differences, if any in the              
thought processes leading to these decisions among expert entrepreneurs and novice           
entrepreneurs (​herein used interchangeably with ‘experts’ & ‘novices’​).  
 
Entrepreneurial decision-making has been referred to as a paradigm with many different            
perspectives to it (Schade, 2010). To cite some examples, Sarasvathy (2001) attempted to             
distinguish the entrepreneurial decision mindset into ‘effectual’ and ‘causal’ approaches, while           
Gustafsson’s (2004) work viewed entrepreneurial decisions along an intuitive-analytic scale.          
This paper, with aims of exploring decision-making at a deeper cognitive level will take the latter                
1 ​* Cognition is the study of individual perceptions, memory and thinking (Mitchell et al., 2002) 
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approach drawing inspiration from the dual-processing model of decision-making (Epstein,          
1994; Slovic et al., 2002). This type of processing model suggests two modes of thinking. The                
first, involves decisions - logical, objective and structured in nature with many scholars calling it               
the ​analytic mode. The second mode is instinctive, emotionally affected and makes associative             
connections. This particular mode has less acceptance among scholars in what it encompasses             
and thus names like experiential, narrative, imagistic system have all been used to describe it.               
However, Epstein (1994) explains that a concrete resolution for which among them is most valid               
is unnecessary since each can be valid in its own way and appropriate for their own certain                 
purposes. Thus, this paper calls the second mode the ​non-analytic mode and will take inspiration               
from multiple dual processing theories to operationalise it in a way that fits the purpose of this                 
paper. 
1.1 Research Gap  
What purpose is served by following the dual-processing model of thinking and splitting             
entrepreneurial decision-making into the categories of analytic and non-analytic ? (​herein used            
interchangeably with ‘AN’ and ‘NA’​). The answer to this lies in the context of the entrepreneurial                
setting. Entrepreneurship as a field is inherently uncertain by the nature of the tasks involved and                
information is a key resource in combatting this uncertainty (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). It is               
argued that an entrepreneur’s battle against uncertainty can be viewed as working under             
conditions of bounded rationality (Cooper et al., 1995) where the human mind’s capabilities are              
seen as limited because of the constraints in information gathering. Under these conditions, there              
are no assumptions about gathered information’s relevancy or whether all of it is processed. The               
decision-making process by entrepreneurs under these conditions can be described as satisfying            
as opposed to optimising (Cooper et al., 1995). This begs the question, how much reliance do                
entrepreneurs place in available information? Do they go by the information gathered and if so,               
to what extent ? This is where the cognitive approach outlined in this paper becomes useful. By                 
distinguishing entrepreneurial decisions into various ​AN ​and NA ​categories, we expect to not             
only determine the extent to which ​experts and ​novices rely on given information, but also how                
they process this information. Furthermore, the compartmentalisation of decisions into ​AN           
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categories allows us to see the extent to which both groups engage in structured behaviour,               
manipulating the data provided (Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994; Gustafsson, 2004). On the other             
hand, ​NA ​classification depicts entrepreneurs’ instinctive motives drawn from external influences           
outside the given data set. 
 
The research gap to perform this study gains its purpose from two distinct areas. First, existing                
research have performed well to initiate the operationalisation of cognitive strategies at a surface              
level. For example, a close study in this line of research by Gustafsson (2004) distinguished               
entrepreneurial decision-making as analytic, quasi-rational or intuitive. The results showed the           
novice sample consisting of college students (entrepreneurs, mba, engineers) to be highly            
analytical decision-makers, whereas the expert entrepreneur sample showed varied approaches          
that depended on the nature of the task in the opportunity-recognition phase. While this paper did                
well to highlight the differences in the two groups, it did not take a penetrative approach                
describing the underlying constructs that make up ​AN and ​NA decision-making. This paper will              
address that issue and by doing so, will contribute to the research area in a way many scholars                  
including Gustafsson herself have urged. For example, in “Thinking about entrepreneurial           
decision-making: a review”, the authors mention how future research on entrepreneurial           
decision-making need to explore the use of heuristics in more detail (Shepherd et al., 2015). This                
paper addresses this need because the different types of heuristics forms the bulk of the               
non-analytic framework.  
 
Second, much of the existing research on entrepreneurial cognition have adopted the early stage              
of opportunity-recognition as its focus due to the critical nature of the task in the entrepreneurial                
journey. (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Dew et al., 2015; Gustafsson, 2004). For eg. Baron &               
Ensley (2006) demonstrated superior pattern recognition skills by expert entrepreneurs when           
compared with novices at the opportunity-recognition stage. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge           
that opportunity-recognition is not the end-all of an entrepreneur's journey. What about after the              
advent of the firm? Schade (2010) mentions some of the other important decisions entrepreneurs              
must take such as “how to enter a market” and “how to terminate the business”. Can we expect                  
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similar results in other entrepreneurial tasks? Thus, there exists research potential outside the             
scope of the opportunity-recognition task. This paper addresses this gap by including five other              
important entrepreneurial tasks into its research design based on existing literature in            
entrepreneurial decision-making  
1.2 Purpose & Aim 
To summarise this paper’s purpose, there exists growing evidence to show varied approaches in              
decision-making strategies of expert entrepreneurs with novice entrepreneurs. Taking a cognitive           
approach to decision-making in the entrepreneurial setting helps us visualise thinking-patterns           
more distinctly, essentially isolating specific strategies of seasoned entrepreneurs. While existing           
work have laid the foundations of this route, researchers have called for a more fine-grained               
construct of the various cognitive processes that encompass entrepreneurial decision-making. In           
addition, recent papers have adopted an opportunity-recognition focus when it comes to studying             
decision-making but we know the entrepreneurial journey involves several other stages. Thus,            
we propose the following research question to further our knowledge in this domain 
 
“How does the use of analytic and non-analytic decision-making differ between novice and             
expert entrepreneurs across different entrepreneurial scenarios” 
 
The aim of this paper is to extend our knowledge on how ​experts and ​novices make decisions in                  
different entrepreneurial scenarios. Recent work have followed an approach that mapped           
decision-making strategies to expected outcomes. We refrain from taking this path, instead            
focussing on providing refined descriptive value by identifying underlying cognitive strategies           
and how they vary from scenario to scenario. The outcomes from this study can be used to                 
isolate expert patterns to further expertise research in the entrepreneurial domain. Results from             
this study could also be be combined with a normative approach to make best-practice claims for                
different scenarios. Finally, we hope that this study will provide ​novices ​with a better              
understanding of how their decision-making differs in comparison with ​experts​, thereby allowing            
novices​ to undertake a new approach with added perspective.  
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1.3 Terminology 
The definitions of novice and expert entrepreneurs are crucial components of this paper and              
therefore needs to be addressed early. This paper defines an expert entrepreneur or ​expert ​as a                
habitual entrepreneur with no less than seven-ten years of entrepreneurial experience. This is the              
shortest time required to gain expertise in the field (Gustafsson, 2004; Feltovich et al., 2006). On                
the other hand, a novice entrepreneur or ​novice​, is an individual ​“​with no prior (minority or                
majority) business ownership experience either as a business founder, an inheritor, or a             
purchaser” ​(Westhead et al., 2005, p. 394). Additionally, to comply against deliberate practice             
literature, a ​novice should not have attained expertise and so by definition must have less than                
seven years of entrepreneurial experience. 
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2​. Theoretical Framework 
 
The introduction highlighted how entrepreneurial decision-making can be considered a          
multifaceted paradigm (Schade, 2010) but also noted the benefits of taking a cognitive approach.              
We mentioned the recent emergence of dual-processing theories of decision-making and argued            
why splitting entrepreneurial decision-making into categories of analytic and non-analytic will           
help in achieving this paper’s purpose. The aim of this section is to break down the many                 
underlying strategies of both categories and form a decision-making framework that can be aptly              
utilised in the methodology to explain how entrepreneurs think when making decisions. 
 
2.1 Analytic Decision-Making 
Throughout literature analytic thinking is discussed as a type of reasoning that requires             
forethought and control(Gustafsson, 2004), often described as planned and intentional (Chaiken,           
1980; Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994). In combination with the description by Gustafsson (2004),             
stating that analytic thinking diverges from an otherwise rather unaided style of thinking, we              
have gathered central themes of what is taken to be analytic. In order to further specify, and                 
ultimately allow us to measure analytic decision-making in an interview with entrepreneurs,            
concepts that indicate this planned and intentional behaviour are at the core of this study. 
  
Detecting analytic decision-making requires a framework of specific concepts that allows for            
compartmentalising and quantifying these occurrences. As this research design is to use            
think-aloud protocols, these concepts are the cornerstone to classifying the various verbal cues             
from the interview. For clarity, the research design is described in detail in section three.               
Literature does not specify finalised categories of analytic cognitive mechanisms, but rather            
provides an understanding of what constitutes analytic behaviour. The following section contains            
various concepts that we place under the umbrella term ​analytic​, based on these characteristics              
from literature. The result of this is a set of sub-categories to analytic thinking, into which we                 
will categorise the various verbal cues from the interviews. 
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2.1.1 Adherence to Data 
Acting with forethought and planning is a central characteristic of analytic behaviour. In the              
context of cognition, it is often addressed in terms of data processing (Gustafsson, 2004).              
Non-analytic behaviour, or more specifically intuition, is seen as rather unaided and the use of               
data is a tool that allows to counteract this. This highlights an important part in defining analytic                 
behaviour, as general adherence to, and processing information falls under this type of reasoning              
(Hammond et al., 1987). An important component of analytic behaviour is pertaining to facts,              
information and data. To be able to measure more specific actions, which show this behaviour in                
the setting of an interview, the following sub-categories will be used. 
 
Hammond et al. (1987) propose an important characteristic that signals analytic behaviour in a              
problem solving context. One distinguishing feature that arises is the matter of objectivity.             
Adherence to data or facts constitutes behaviour that can objectively be realised. This is              
discussed as a counterweight to intuitive behaviour. This allows for a first sub-category of              
analytic behaviour to be formed, which we label ​Focus on Data​. Verbal cues that reflect general                
adherence to data are therefore counted as indicating analytic decision-making in the interviews             
we conduct with the entrepreneurs. Examples regarding these subcategories can be found in the              
Appendix: 7.3 Table of Codes. For more accurate measurement, further instances of adhering to              
data need to be addressed. What further will be categorised under Data Focus are decisions that                
are purely dependent on data provided. Any decision that originates from simply choosing from              
available information or options, will fall under this sub-category. Continuing with the notion of              
objective reliability, it is important to note that adherence to data comes in various forms.               
Gustafsson (2004) highlights distinct aspects which allow for more specific classification of            
decisions that make use of data. One of these distinct behaviours is individuals making              
references to not having enough information or data to go by. This type of statement signals the                 
aforementioned adherence to data and adds to our research by providing one more specific              
sub-category which can be detected in a TAP setting. The verbal cues that signal this lack of data                  
will be categorised in ​Insufficient Data. 
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 To further avoid categorising responses under a very broad umbrella term, Gustafsson’s provides             
further distinct aspects that are said to signal adherence to data. A third sub-category which will                
be used to categorise the verbal cues from the interviews is made up of occurrences when                
participants change their mind based on new data. Epstein et al. (1996) discuss this type of                
behaviour, showing it signals individual's’ tendency to act according to data/information, and is             
said to indicate analytic reasoning. ​Changing Mind ​(because of new data) is the fourth              
sub-category of analytic decision-making which will be used to categorise the verbal cues from              
the interviews. Further concepts need to be included into this framework so that the analytic               
decision-making during the interviews can be detected and categorised. These further concepts            
are related in the sense of making use of data, but focuses on aided and systematic                
decision-making. 
2.1.2 A Formal, Structured or Systematic Approach 
Ulvila and Brown (1982) elaborate on various ways in which analytic behaviour addresses             
information using formal systematic and established procedures. As such, this provides a suitable             
sub-category of analytic decision-making pertaining to instances where a formal procedure is            
used to manipulate data. Some elaboration is provided by Gustafsson (2004) who discusses this              
behaviour as known techniques that are used in the process of decision-making. Some examples              
that arise throughout the work of Ulvila and Brown (1982) are probability calculations and              
decision-tree analytics. In addition to computations such as return on investment and profit             
maximisation, the arsenal of entrepreneurs and managers includes strategic tools such as SWOT             
or Critical Questions Analyses, which all come as an aid to the quantities of variables an                
entrepreneur deals with (Helms and Nixon, 2010). Instances that display systems or techniques,             
used to manipulate the data, will be categorised as analytic behaviour. These occurrences will be               
coded as ​Formal Systematic Methods.  
  
Logical deductions are a concept that are linked to the aforementioned formal systematic             
approach. Following a set of axioms to make use of information is a further subset of analytic                 
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decision-making. Gustafsson (2004) describes such behaviour as controlled, with authors such as            
Hammond et al. (1987) highlighting that this analytic behaviour results in a particular confidence              
that decision-makers have in this systematic approach. Once again the usage of available             
information is central to this behaviour and could perhaps be categorised as adherence to data.               
The motivation for adding this further category, labelled ​Logical Deductions, ​is to enable more              
honed detection of various analytic decision-making instances during the interviews. Two further            
sub-categories of analytic behaviour will be introduced in this framework, in order to ensure              
correct detection of analytic behaviour throughout the TAP​. 
  
Shanteau (1988) addresses behaviour which cannot truly be categorised as formal methods. This             
type of analytic behaviour rather corresponds to analytic approaches to a problem. One such              
proposed approach occurs when individuals segment problems into smaller, more manageable           
parts, in order to overcome the hardship of the original decision. This type of behaviour cannot                
be factored into a formal systematic approach, as it does not follow a set of formalised rules, but                  
rather ought to be seen as a separate technique falling under analytic behaviour. Gustafsson              
(2004) discusses this phenomenon in different words, referring to actions that decompose            
problems into smaller elements. These very similar interpretations of what the authors deem to              
be analytic decision-making provide yet another sub-category of analytic behaviour, which will            
be used throughout this study. Instances that reflect this behaviour will be coded in the category                
Divide & Conquer. While not a formal system, this type of behaviour does coincide with the                
aforementioned notions of aiding and planning during the decision process. A final sub-category             
of analytic decision-making will be introduced, which falls in line with this approach as well.               
Shanteau (1988) discusses behaviour which entails the system of estimations that aid the             
decision-process in avoiding large errors. In the process of separating a problem into more              
manageable and useful parts, these estimations aid in conducting an analytic thought process.             
During the interviews with entrepreneurs, any instance which indicates this type of systematic             
behaviour will be coded in the category called ​Ballpark Estimation​.  
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2.2 Non-Analytic Decision-Making   
Little doubt exists that humans do not always follow the analytic mode outlined above.              
Researchers have suggested a second processing style that relies on instincts and emotions to              
make decisions inspired by years of evolution (Epstein, 1994; Slovic et al., 2002). This particular               
mode has several theories of what it encompasses and as a result have different names attached                
to it. However, Epstein (1994) argues that they can all be valid with some more appropriate than                 
others for different purposes. This paper gathers support from a few of those theories to               
operationalise decision-making that deviates from analytical thinking under the term          
non-analytic. 
 
A theory by Tversky & Kahneman (1974) introduces the ​NA ​concept of heuristics or              
cognitive-shortcuts to aid in decision-making. Researchers have opposing views on whether           
these shortcuts work in favour of the decision-maker or against them. Some scholars argue that               
there is an optimal decision and these heuristics only distract the decision-maker (Hutton &              
Klein, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) while others argue that these mental short-cuts, allow              
the decision-maker to recognise a course of action based on familiar situations. (Hutton & Klein               
1999). In the entrepreneurial setting, researchers argue that heuristics allow entrepreneurs to            
make quick decisions in highly uncertain environments (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Mitchell et             
al., 2007) with evidence to suggest experts’ greater reliance on heuristics (Gustafsson, 2004).             
Other dual-processing theories highlight the importance of emotions as a ​NA ​concept. For             
example, Epstein (1994) mentions that several authors have introduced an intuitive mode that             
operates on a range from simple to complex that is determined by the degree of emotions and                 
moods. In the entrepreneurial setting, researchers have conceded the role of emotions and             
concluded that it is an undeniable part of an entrepreneur's life and decision-making ​(Mitchell et               
al., 2007). Thus, it is clear that heuristics and emotions are crucial decision-making components              
in the entrepreneurial setting and the following section aims to break them down further. 
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2.2.1 Heuristics 
Heuristics is a simplifying strategy employed by individuals to make a decision and draws from               
ideas, beliefs, experiences, mood and informal processes. (Mitchell et al 2007; Kahneman, 2011;             
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). It has been used as a giant umbrella term when discussing               
decisions that have a basis in the ​NA ​realm and this section intends to categorise this term into                  
smaller, well defined components.  
 
Rules of Thumb  
One way heuristics has been described is in the form of cognitive frameworks that allows               
individuals to make decisions by piecing together different information to form specific rules             
that can be applied (Busenitz & Barney, 1997), commonly referred to as rules of thumb. Fong et                 
al. (1986) make the case for abstract inferential rule systems that guide thought processes. They               
showed how people that underwent training in the law of large numbers displayed improved              
statistical performance across many everyday problems. They also demonstrated how teachings           
in domain specific rules led to improvements across other domains. In the entrepreneurial             
context, a field rife with uncertainties, these rules of thumb or heuristics are argued to allow                
entrepreneurs to make sense of the complex situation quickly and sometimes even produce             
superior results (Mitchell et al. 2007). Instances detecting pre-defined set of rules used to              
understand their environment (Simon & Houghton, 2002) will be coded as rules of thumb. For               
example: “Always buy a screen protector for your phone” 
 
Representativeness Heuristics  
Another subset of heuristics, representativeness is a phenomenon in which individuals tend to             
make generalisations on individuals or topics based on only a few details about them (Busenitz,               
1999). This was demonstrated in a study asking participants to guess the profession of an               
individual based on a brief personality description of that person. Results showed that the              
majority of participants ranked their choices in a similar order without real evidence to suggest               
the person’s profession (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). While it may seem counter-productive to             
make decisions based on representativeness due to the lack of substantive evidence; in an              
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uncertain entrepreneurial setting, these techniques can be especially valuable due to the lack of              
time and institutional support in gaining random samples (Busenitz, 1999; Katz, 1992). A study              
also found entrepreneurs to use representativeness to a much higher degree compared to             
managers in large organisations (Busenitz & Barney, 1997). For the purpose of this study,              
instances with clear generalisations will be coded as such. For eg: “This phone should have               
better performance because it looks like an iPhone”.  
 
Affect​ ​Heuristic  
Like other heuristic mechanisms where individuals rely on simplifications of mental processes to             
make decisions, affect heuristic is another strategy used wherein the individual’s reasoning            
moves away from the systematic deduction of facts and instead relies on the positive and               
negative feelings generated (Slovic et al., 2002). This extends to individuals making judgements             
based on the idea of liking or disliking something instead of deliberate reasoning (Kahneman,              
2011). There is little doubt today that affect plays a role in decision-making with multiple studies                
showing its prevalence (Slovic et al., 2006; Hsee and Menon, 1999). The relevance of affect in                
the entrepreneurial setting has been acknowledge by Baron (2008). He claims that affect             
heuristic is useful in unpredictable contexts as it helps “tip the balance” to make a decision. He                 
also highlights that affect has been shown to be influential in the creative process and other tasks                 
relevant to entrepreneurs and therefore concludes it to be an essential decision-making strategy             
for entrepreneurs. Instances suggesting individuals leaning on the good/bad or simple feelings            
will be coded as such. For example: “I don’t know why but I feel this is a better phone” 
 
StoryTelling/Creative Solutions 
Many authors are of the idea that narratives provide a method to explain our mental               
representations (Epstein, 1994). Baumeister & Newman (1994) suggest that narratives are           
instrumental exercises in self-interpretation by which people make sense of their experiences.            
Thus, as means of simplifying and giving meaning to their experiences, it can be considered to                
be a form of heuristics. Hutton & Klein (1999) explains the role of narration in decision-making                
suggesting it allows individuals to mentally simulate how situations will develop by perceiving             
resemblance and typicalities from past experiences. This allows them to see how situations arise              
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and judge outcomes. Thus, instances of mental simulation providing narration to explain past             
experience will be coded under storytelling. For example: “I once bought this phone that beeped               
randomly. I thought I bought a broken phone so never paid attention to it, but later realised I                  
could turn it off in the settings. It's not always the machine’s fault you know! ”. Similarly,                 
Shanteau (1988) mentions the likelihood of generating new ideas and reinterpreting outcomes in             
novel ways in expert decision-making. These instances detecting creative thought or narratives            
leading to novel outcomes will be coined as creative solutions. For example: “Phones are nice               
and it has helped me find my way so many times, but why not just use a watch?”  
 
Other Heuristics 
Heuristics is a complex cognitive system of breaking information down to make meaningful             
interpretations (Kahneman, 2011). The above categories make up some of the commonly            
researched heuristic strategies. But due to the complexity of this phenomenon, we expect             
instances that do not fit into the above categories. Thus, simple references to ‘personal              
experience’ (Busenitz and Barney, 1997) and heuristical simplifications that do not fall in the              
preceding sections will be categorised under this category. For example: “I have learnt that big               
phones are not very good for typing”. 
 
Ignore The Fluff 
Heuristics have been referred to as drawing from informal processes and heuristic logics are said               
to allow entrepreneurs to make sense of uncertain situations more quickly (Mitchell et al., 2007).               
Until now, we have only identified heuristic concepts that can be actively measured by response.               
Shanteau (1988) mentions that expert decision-makers are able to identify information that is             
valuable and disregard those they deem unnecessary. Similarly, Mitchell & Chesteen (1995)            
suggest expert entrepreneurs to able to extract relevant information quickly. Thus, we aim to              
include a task in our methodology to see if our sample entrepreneurs see past unnecessary               
information. Instances of this category will be coded when respondents do not make references              
to information that is deemed redundant by the authors of this study. 
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2.2.2 Emotions 
Entrepreneurship by virtue of context is a highly emotional field. The combination of             
uncertainty, time-pressures and extent of personal consequences contribute to this cause (Cardon            
et al., 2012). Empirical evidence exists that show entrepreneurs try to avoid negative emotions              
(Wong et al., 2006) and others have shown the importance of positive emotions for entrepreneurs               
in starting ventures (Hayward et al., 2010). Nonetheless, the fact that emotions matter in the               
entrepreneurial process is well-established (Brundin & Gustafsson, 2013). This section          
introduces two ​NA ​concepts associated with emotions/moods that were identified as being            
especially susceptible to entrepreneurs (Baron​,​ 1998).  
 
Counterfactual Thinking  
This phenomenon stems from ​emotional feelings of regret and manifests as thoughts of ‘if only’               
or ‘what might have been’ (Baron, 1998). Research for this phenomenon has been based on deep                
rooted emotional responses to events where the individual came close to achieving his/her goal              
but eventually failed. A study on athletes measured responses of silver medal winners in              
comparison to bronze medal winners. The results showed that despite being better off, silver              
medal winners focussed on what they failed to achieve whereas bronze medal winners were more               
content. These thoughts have also been seen in students that closely miss out on an ‘A’. The                 
authors of the study insists that that feelings of regret from close misses can haunt individuals for                 
a very long period of time (Medvec et al.; 1995). Baron (1998) makes the connection of regret                 
and counterfactual thinking relevant to the field of entrepreneurship. He concluded that            
entrepreneurs overall display less regretful thinking than non-entrepreneurs, but suggested that           
successful entrepreneurs use these thoughts to make more optimal decision in future (Baron             
2004). Instances where entrepreneurs point towards feelings of regret or past learnings to make a               
future decision will be coded as counterfactual thinking. For example: “Buying a blackberry             
phone was a waste of $300, and I will never make that mistake again”.  
 
Affect Infusion  
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As humans, everyone experiences days that feel worse than others and your perception of others               
on those days are not necessarily the same (Forgas, 1993). This altered perception as a direct                
result of an affective state is the idea behind affect infusion (Baron, 1998). Our ‘feelings’ or                
‘affective state’ is vulnerable to outside influences and research has shown that it can be altered                
to produce different outcomes (Forgas, 1995; Robbins and DeNisi, 1998). For eg. Baron (1993)              
found that participants that were primed to to experience different moods, rated job applicants              
differently. Baron (1998) suspects entrepreneurs more likely to be affected by this phenomenon             
due to the emotional investment they place in their ideas, commitment and vision. This study is                
less concerned about the affective states itself but moreso about instances that reference its              
influence. For example, “If I’m in a good mood, I will splurge to buy the latest model of the                   
phone” 
 
Emotional Choice 
In addition to the above two concepts that draws its basis in the past role of affect or references                   
to the role of affect, we propose another ​NA ​concept, emotional choice which deals with               
emotions in the present state. It will take from Cardon et al., (2012) which suggests               
entrepreneurial emotion as the role of affect, emotions or feelings concurrent with the             
entrepreneurial process. An example that can highlight this behaviour is “I have to be confident               
that workers that made this phone were treated fairly before buying it”.  
2.2.3 Expertise  
An assumption held in the introduction is that ​experts ​are likely to display expert characteristics               
through years of deliberate practice in the domain. This section aims to explore expertise              
literature to understand the development of these skills. 
 
The study of expertise initially began in the 1940s with assessing professional chess players.              
Researchers found experts to have significantly better piece recall compared to novice players.             
They later explained this phenomenon suggesting experts perceive information as meaningful           
patterns and thus store these patterns as easily reproducible ‘chunks’ (Feltovich et al., 2006;              
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Gustafsson, 2004; Chase & Simon, 1973). So experts perceive information in different ways, but              
how does an expert get to that point? 
 
Ericsson et al. (1993) argues that expertise is gained with the act of prolonged deliberate practice                
that enhances the cognitive adaptation to learn and improve skill acquisition. They added that it               
is a highly structured activity where the individual monitors his/her performance and does not              
necessarily enjoy the process. Experience alone is not a defining factor unless paired with              
deliberate intent to improve. (Ericsson et al., 1993). This process repeated for a minimum of               
seven-ten years in a particular domain lends itself to acquired expertise in the field (Gustafsson,               
2004; Feltovich et al., 2006). In entrepreneurship, Baron & Henry (2010) stress the applicability              
of deliberate practice literature and also found empirical evidence to suggest that experienced             
entrepreneurs store information differently compared to ​novices​. Other empirical studies also           
exist with growing support for developed entrepreneurial cognitions or scripts in expert            
entrepreneurs (Mitchell et al., 2002; Gustafsson, 2004; Dew et al., 2009). 
 
2.2.3 Decision-Making Framework  
The previous sections dissected decision-making into several ​AN and ​NA concepts based on             
existing dual-processing theories. With these defined concepts, we can move to create a             
framework that allows us to assess the differences in decision-making strategies used between             
experts ​and ​novices ​across many entrepreneurial scenarios.  
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Figure 1: Decision Making Framework 
 
 
Figure 1 highlights the specific concepts we have identified in the theoretical framework. We              
aim to use think-aloud-protocols - discussed in-depth in the following section, to identify and              
code these concepts. We take a mixed approach combining both quantitative and qualitative             
elements. The numbers yielded from coding will aid in providing a better understanding of the               
balance in concepts used. However, the findings itself will be descriptive in nature allowing a               
better look into how these decisions are made. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Research Design 
To tackle the question - ​How does the use of analytic and non-analytic decision-making differ               
between novice and expert entrepreneurs across different entrepreneurial scenarios -          
participants were asked to solve a new venture case utilising five scenarios ranging from entry to                
company exit. This study takes a qualitative research approach, while maintaining some            
quantitative elements. A similar approach was taken by Dew et. al (2009) when comparing              
effectual and predictive logics among MBA students and expert entrepreneurs, with more            
emphasis on the quantitative elements. The sample size of this study is smaller, and the focus lies                 
with ​how ​the behaviour differs, aiming to provide insight into the differences. Simple             
quantitative measures are used to highlight differences between ​novices and ​experts across            
entrepreneurial scenarios, and the qualitative analysis aims to describe and categorise           
participants’ decision-making. A process tracing technique from verbal protocols, called          
think-aloud protocols (​herein used interchangeably with ‘TAP’​), was chosen for its strength in             
providing access to participants’ internal processes (Fonteyn et al., 1993).  
  
To ensure plentiful data collection, the use of retrospective verbal reports is employed on top of                
the concurrent verbalisation of the participants, resulting in a mixed methods approach. While             
gaining insight into the thought processes it is helpful to combine this with some explanation by                
the participants. In order to avoid inferential bias, which occurs when the participants describe              
their behaviour without displaying it, literature by Ericsson (2006) was consulted. The author             
explains that this bias is avoided when the retrospective explanation happens within less than ten               
seconds of the actual decision. When testing the initial case the answers emerged to be less                
descriptive than desired, and therefore called for the addition of ​why questions, in order to               
generate enough data. These were added in accordance with the work by Ericsson (2006). 
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3.2 Sampling and Subjects 
Purposive sampling was used to select participants, since the aim was to compare traits of the                
two subgroups of entrepreneurs. A sample of four ​novices was assessed in comparison to a               
sample of four ​experts​. As discussed by Bryman and Bell (2011, p.492) this non-probability              
sample posed the greatest chance for rich results, as it allowed us to compare two groups based                 
on their characteristics. As this purpose is to compare decision-making behaviour among ​novices             
and ​experts​, the criteria for our selection was focused on the years that the entrepreneurs has                
been in business. We follow literature on deliberate practice, which suggests that seven to ten               
years allows for individuals to develop expertise and therefore constitutes being an expert in a               
field (Feltovich et al., 2006; Gustafsson, 2004). For the purpose of obtaining noticeable             
differences in behaviour between the two groups, we interviewed individuals that did not fall              
close to this seven year mark for ​experts and instead set the bar at ten years. Similarly, although                  
the definition for ​novices ​corresponds to first-time business owners with less than seven years of               
experience, our selection focused on ​novices​ that had less than one year of business experience. 
 
The process of finding participants came through personal connections and an environment rich             
with entrepreneurial undertakings. Through the entrepreneurship course at Lund University, and           
the adjacent business hub Ideon, access to existing firms and entrepreneurs was gained through              
emails and visits to their offices. This was a strong source for expert participants. Similarly,               
personal engagements such as competitions and an internship worked strongly in favour of             
finding suitable participants for the novice group.  
  
As part of adding to the transparency of our research, the participants were asked to provide                
information as seen in the table below. A secondary purpose to collecting this information was to                
provide a basis for analysis and interpretation of the results, as this could be improved through                
consideration for the various qualities the interviewees portrayed. The rather personal nature of             
the TAP, and due to the requested information, participants’ names were altered for anonymity. 
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3.3 Interview Process 
Participants were handed the case, along with a one page description and verbal preparation for               
the interview process. On suggestion from Ericsson & Simon (1998) two sample questions were              
administered in order to warm up and formulate an understanding of the expectations of think               
aloud protocols. In order to receive the most accurate and direct verbalisation, emphasis was              
placed on the instruction to verbalise even the most minute thoughts that occur during the               
process. In line with concerns raised by Fonteyn et al. (1993) the only instruction given during                
the problem solving was to urge participants to continue verbalising their thoughts. The problem              
sets followed a chronological order resembling the life of a startup, with clear segmentation at               
every different scenario. The following structure was used: 
  
A)​ ​Entry Scenario 
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B)​ ​Pricing Scenario 
C)​ ​Marketing Scenario 
D)​ ​Termination Scenario 
E)​ ​Exit Scenario 
  
The specific questions for all of these topics can be found in the Appendix: 7.1 Case. The                 
analysis aims to categorise responses into the subcategories of ​AN ​and ​NA ​decisions which are               
discussed in the theoretical framework. 
  
The interviews were conducted in separate rooms, with only the participant and researchers. The              
majority of the interviews were conducted at the participants’ workplaces, in order to promote a               
real-world setting and the hope to induce responses most representative of real-world behaviour.             
The duration of the interviews ranged from 40 to 90 minutes. 
 
3.4 Data Analysis 
The interviews were recorded and transcribed in order to permit coding of the information              
provided by the participants. A coding scheme was created and can be seen in full in the                 
Appendix: 7.2 Coding Scheme. Following the structure outlined by Bryman and Bell (2011) the              
data was addressed, independently by both researchers, firstly using open coding where verbal             
cues and semantic bundles were highlighted. Consensus had to be reached regarding the selected              
observations to eliminate biases and data disparity. These were then categories into the sets of               
AN ​and ​NA (coding). Since no external re-coder was used, the re-coding was done separately by                
both authors of this study. Gustafsson (2004) indicates this option as being suitable, and              
highlights that re-coding increases reliability. The responses were then quantified to reveal            
behavioural differences between our two groups of entrepreneurs, across the different scenarios.            
A table of codes, and corresponding sample quotes from the participants can be found in the                
Appendix: 7.3 Table of Codes. 
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3.5 Case Selection 
In creating a study to measure ​AN ​and ​NA ​decision-making, the immense subjectivity of              
decision-making has to be noted. Creating a case suitable for this was not in the scope of this                  
study considering the limited time. Any case for this study had to simulate, to the best of its                  
abilities, real-life entrepreneurial tasks. Sarasvathy’s (2008) case from the book ​Effectuation:           
Elements of Entrepreneurial Expertise ​was chosen​, ​with questions having been altered to more             
specifically address concerns important to this study. By using an existing case from a renowned               
researcher, the results are intended to have more value, as a result from its frequent usage in                 
literature surrounding decision behaviour. In order to condense the research instrument for time             
purposes, and for clarity regarding our priorities, some alterations were made to the various              
components of the case. 
  
Three major alterations were made to this case that served to address the specific needs of this                 
paper are as follows: 
a. ​A graph was added in order to test for adherence to data. The intention was to check if                   
participants would bring up the graph or disregard it based on its limited relevance.              
The formulation of this graph was rooted in the suggestion that ​experts show better              
ability in identifying relevant information (Shanteau, 1988).  
b. A termination scenario was incorporated into the study in hopes of revealing decision              
strategies in situations where high emotional factors might come into play. This            
scenario was incorporated especially with the intention of posing a difficult dilemma.            
Baron et al. (2001) discuss employee termination in a start-up context, highlighting it             
as being a common decision for founders as well as discussing it as a tool to gain                 
profitability. As such, this scenario is added to our study as a fitting real world               
decision that entrepreneurs face. 
c. Questions were altered with the purpose of prompting participants to verbalise their             
thoughts with minimal intervention from the researchers. ​Why ​was added to the end             
of the questions, in order to ensure richer data collection. 
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The specific scenarios were selected to be representative of real world decisions that             
entrepreneurs face, and also highlight the differences between novices and expert entrepreneurs.            
The scenarios aim to shed light on how much the entrepreneurs focus on the data at hand, how                  
much they rely on inputs not provided in the case, and their tendency to rely on emotions and                  
personal belief. Based on certain qualities of the questions, we will be able to see decision                
behaviour under particular conditions. Based on Hammond et al. (1987) one is able to describe               
some scenarios showing more intuition-inducing or analysis-inducing qualities. Scenario two          
shows the most analytic-inducing characteristics, as it has a high degree of objective             
measurability and quantitative information that is presented sequentially to participants. Scenario           
four is taken to be the most intuition-inducing task due to the openness to interpretation and the                 
limited information, providing a more uncertain environment. 
  
3.6 Limitations and Weaknesses 
A clear overview of the limitations of this study can be given following a chronological order of                 
the process. 
 
The approach of addressing decision-making in an ​AN and ​NA manner, brings with it the               
problem of bias affecting the scope of this study. As discussed in the introduction there are                
multiple ways in which one may inspect decision-making. One of these options is using ​AN and                
NA​, yet a clear weakness is that this does not encompass the other approaches. As a result of                  
choosing this one approach we are therefore only able to describe decision-making from this              
perspective, leaving perhaps much of the topic unexplored. This problem is reoccurring at             
various stages of this study such as at the planning stages and literature review, data collection                
and ultimately analysis. The combined effect ought to be seen as a significant weakness of this                
study. 
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Recording and analyzing the data is a further step of this study which highlights some               
weaknesses. The measurement of verbal cues is undoubtedly influenced by subjectivity of the             
researchers. Independently coding the transcribed interviews is the most crucial step in ensuring             
credible data for this research. Consensus regarding the codes is essential to not riddle the data                
with personal feelings about responses, as otherwise the bias would threaten our results. 
 
Some specific limitations of our study come from our selection of interviewees as well as our                
case selection for this purpose. The sample of entrepreneurs was purposefully aimed to be very               
broad. The culturally diverse set of participants brings with it the downfall of a language barrier.                
Especially in a process such as TAP, it can create problems for data collection. The language of                 
the questions can create difficulties for the participants in understanding the message of the              
question. As a result, there is a chance that the questions are seen as quite different, and therefore                  
the responses will not be suitable for comparison. Additionally, in a setting such as for TAP,                
where verbal cues of any sort are helpful for the researchers, it is important to note that these                  
cues might not be verbalised in an English-speaking experiment, if the participant thinks in a               
different language. As such, data is lost and also it adds a limitation to our study, as comparisons                  
between individuals may then not be the most accurate. 
 
This research tool will be used by two master students with no prior experience with this                
instrument. Despite literature having been consulted, the TAP will not be as credible and              
well-executed as from professionals. Coupled with the fact that we hope to describe complex              
behaviour using the concepts described in our theoretical framework, our research tool does not              
guarantee findings. Having taken this ​AN and ​NA approach limits our measurable variables and              
may lead to recording incomplete data, especially given the very complex nature of             
decision-making. As part of counteracting this, much of the work, and coding, with the              
interviews will be done separately and subsequently compared to reach consensus. This, in part,              
acts as a countermeasure to some of the general criticisms of the TAP instrument. 
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The question regarding validity of this type data is subject to discussion throughout literature, as               
highlighted by Ericsson and Simon (1980). Learnings regarding the value of ​soft data and the               
analysis of TAP description are heeded throughout this study. The analysis will be given specific               
attention in order to depict the findings as data as opposed to personal interpretation, a common                
criticism of this type of research. As emphasised by Schkade and Payne (1994, p.104) the               
procedure of questioning participants is heavily subject to subtleties of language. To obtain data              
which is free of 1) researcher’s bias 2) leading the participants and 3) causing subjects to try                 
infer about intentions of the study, special care will be given the formulation of both the                
problems and the questions. 
 
Attempting to limit the behaviour of participants trying to infer about the research purpose, the               
participants will be asked to remain focused on the problems and information at hand. Ericsson               
and Simon (1980) reflect that not heeding the information is a major reason for interviewees to                
make inferences about the questions, and stray away from providing desired quality of answers. 
 
One limitation that arises from the theoretical framework involves breaking ​AN & ​NA ​into its               
constituent parts. For example, heuristics and emotions are very complex human systems that sit              
interlinked with each other. Our attempt to divide them is based on existent theory which has                
only scratched the surface of of these complex mechanisms. It is likely that cues identified based                
on these theories do not portray the full picture in terms of actual reasoning. As a result, each                  
decision can draw inspiration from multiple heuristics but the extracted cue only identifies one.  
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4. Findings & Analysis 
Please refer to Appendix: 7.4 Results Table & 7.5 Answer Statistics for figures 
4.1 Entry Scenario  
In this scenario, the participants were asked to decide on their target customer, as well as their                 
target market for the imaginary product - a simulation environment for entrepreneurship. The             
information states it can be an instructional technology or a simulation game. They were given               
some numerical data and were also provided with a graph about historical trends for these               
markets. 
 
Novices​: 
The answers from the ​novices were mixed with cues showing both analytic ​and non-analytic              
behaviour, although leaning more towards ​AN​.  
 
The least used strategies in the entry scenario by the ​novices were all ​NA​: representativeness               
heuristics, emotional choice, ignoring the fluff and storytelling. One ​novice​, Karl, reflected this             
latter type of behaviour with the statement​“If my main focus is to be put towards adults, I would also                   
have to figure out the meaning of what educators to address, which would take up a lot of time, and I                     
really don’t know anyone for that”​. ​There were emotionally dependent behaviours with references             
to ​‘gut feeling’ and benevolence related discussion. An instance where a participant drew from              
emotion is shown below. 
 
 “I think you learn better when being instructed, so I would want my software in the hands of                  
educators..I want people to like this program... and if it is effective then at least I would be more inclined                    
to like it” 
 
Other ​NA behaviour displayed with greater frequency were simple subjective preferences (affect            
heuristics) and other heuristics. 
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The ​novices ​did not hesitate to engage in analytic behaviour either, with high instances recorded               
for focus on data and formal systematic methods. As ​Novices ​kept a close eye on the data, high                  
numbers were recorded for logical deductions. This can be seen with statements such as: 
 
“Choosing to target educators is difficult, because then you are dependent on what type of               
students they are involved with...so then I could just save myself the trouble and target end customers                 
straight away because then I only have to figure out the requirements of one target group”   
 
Novices ​were also quick to point out that the information provided was insufficient signalling ​AN               
behaviour. This scenario also provided the participants with a diagram designed with the             
intention to provide redundant information. The objective of this graph was to measure             
adherence and engagement with this information and the findings showed that all but one ​novice               
did so. 
 
Experts: 
The responses from the ​experts were mixed with both types of decision strategies visible,              
although ​NA ​reasoning was used to a much higher degree. Interestingly, the most used analytic               
choice here was pointing to insufficient data: ​“Without knowing more details, I could not say               
anything else”​. 
 
The category of rules of thumb lead the way in this scenario for ​NA behaviour. ​Experts showed                 
this type of reasoning in five instances. For example, Miro shows some form of underlying               
cognitive framework or script when deciding on which customer group to target.  
 
“You don’t have to always pick the bigger one but one that will make the most impact” 
 
Another ​expert​, Harald used similar rules to guide judgement when assessing the market. He was               
apprehensive of the enormous size of the education industry and made the following statement,              
“There’s this risk when you go into a huge market like that”​. ​Other codes that made appearances were                  
representativeness and narration in the form of providing creative solutions. For example, Fiona             
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did not want to pick either options provided in the data set and instead decided on her own                  
solution. 
 
“I would not only promote this as a game, but also as an instructional product. It should be both, 
otherwise it will lose the younger audience. But I would include the right tools into the game and 
then it can be placed in both” 
 
All four ​experts spent limited time in engaging or analysing the supplemented graph and thus               
appeared to ‘ignore the fluff’. Harald even stated it to be ​“useless”​.  
 
Entry Scenario Analysis: 
While ​novices adhered to the numbers with focus on data and logical deductions among the top                
categories, their use of heuristics were also apparent with affect heuristic being a top category               
and other heuristics as well. A discussion by Anderson (1988) regarding information processing             
in professionals and non-professionals addresses part of this behaviour. ​Novices are suggested to             
follow the cues at hand, often in the same order they are provided, which lends itself as a                  
credible proposition given that our results show ​novices focusing on data and addressing it in a                
logically deductive manner. This behaviour is ​AN by nature, as discussed in literature. The              
novices’ ​use of affect heuristics implies that when these ​novices deliberate on uncertain tasks,              
they do not generate inclinations based on cognitive frameworks or predefined notions but rather              
follow general feeling towards an option. This behaviour differed from the behaviour of the              
experts​, which showed a systematic understanding of the problem through working with rules of              
thumb. Andersson (2004) provides insights which this behaviour falls in line with. The             
behaviour of the ​novices showed the formation of opinions, with the intent of finding data to                
support these claims. The result in our study showed however, that they did not find the                
affirmation and the decisions reflected rather opinionated answers with little factual support.            
Andersson further discusses the expert behaviour of following a mental checklist, which can ba              
argued to be apparent through their use of rules of thumb. Here the ​experts used general                
understanding of a certain topic, to more closely explain their opinions. What our results do not                
reflect is whether or not the ​experts were trying to find data to contradict their beliefs, which                 
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according to Anderson (1988) is proposed to be the case. The general understanding we get from                
this is, that ​expert​ and ​novice​ use of heuristics differed. 
 
An apparent occurrence was that ​novices engaged far more with the particular problem set,              
compared to the ​experts​. This showed in their tendency to follow the given information, rather               
than addressing the question from a more broad perspective. This is evidently different from how               
the ​experts ​acted, as seen in their aforementioned use of rules of thumb and comparably high                
count of representative heuristics. What furthermore emphasises this realisation is that ​novices            
indicated very little transferred knowledge from their previous experiences. Inversely the ​experts            
indicated drawing from previous learnings. These results fall in line with Cohen and Levinthal’s              
(1990) statements that experts make more use of previously gained knowledge, and apply this in               
new situations. Our results further indicate this, when considering that the largest difference             
between strategies used in this scenario was rules of thumb, where ​experts indicated the use five                
times and ​novices none. ​Novices were focused on the data five times compared to the ​experts                
who only did so once. This is taken as a clear indication for ​AN behaviour. Gustafsson’s (2004)                 
findings, which argue that ​novices are more analytic in the opportunity-recognition phase, seem             
to hold true for this first scenario of our study. ​Experts have repeat experience in performing this                 
task and have thus formed ideas and beliefs of what works and what does not, through years of                  
deliberate practice.Through this they were able to create a much more detailed understanding of              
the problem statement, without adhering to analysis of the information. 
 
The ability to ignore irrelevant information was seen in how the participants made use of the                
graph. As proposed by Shanteau (1992) experts show better ability in identifying relevant             
information, and therefore may require less of it. Through this, the ​experts focused less on the                
data. 
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4.2 Pricing Scenario  
In this scenario the participants were asked to make a decision about their pricing strategy, given                
two sets of data reflecting customers’ willingness to pay. Additionally, the scenario asked the              
participants if they changed their mind on their target customer upon reviewing information in              
this scenario. This scenario was designed to be the most analytic-inducing of all due to a high                 
degree of objective measurability in the data provided (Hammond et al., 1987).  
 
Novices: 
Without surprise, the most used strategies by ​novices ​in this scenario were ​AN​. A high focus on                 
data was present with statements like ​“these numbers coincide” and “judging from these             
number”. ​Novices ​pointed out insufficient data in five occasions. For example, Karl added,​“This             
information does not really provide and add much for me...I would instead need…”​. Novices also               
utilised the data provided to make logical deductions a top strategy.  
 
“Price it too high and they won’t want it. And price it too low, then you basically say that you aren’t 
worth much”  
 
Two ​novices ​changed their mind on their answer from the first scenario after analyzing this               
scenario displaying ​AN behaviour. ​“Given this, I am inclined to change my response…” ​and ​“I am                
unsure, I might change my mind” 
 
Novices also engaged in several ​NA ​strategies in this scenario. The use of various heuristic               
strategies were visible with representativeness, other heuristics and rules of thumb each recorded             
a total of four times. 
 
Experts: 
This scenario recorded the highest instances of analytic behaviour among ​experts compared to             
other scenarios. However, they still preferred ​NA ​strategies in total. Two of the most used               
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strategies were ​NA ​while one was ​AN​. Many creative solutions were visible, Fiona mentioned              
that given the results of the survey she was inclined to make a ​“lighter version (of the app)” ​and go                    
to market early. However, before doing so, she indicated using a formal method of trial and error                 
to test the pricing. She mentions:  
 
“First, I will price it at this range, see what happens and then create the lighter version based on those 
results” 
 
Harald was not very confident with the options provided stating the need for more data. He                
backed that feeling by performing some quick calculations, which we coded as a formal              
systematic method, saying ​“There’s no way to get the return on investment”​. ​Another ​expert showed               
a different analytic approach to tackling pricing. Finn, uses a ballparking strategy , ​“I would first                
pick an option from the lower category first” and then after careful analysis, “something in the upper                 
end… okay I will price at 700”. 
 
Pricing Scenario Analysis: 
The ​novices continue to remain predominantly ​AN​, and interestingly this scenario marks the most              
AN behaviour for the ​experts. As discussed in the methodology, this scenario is deemed the most                
analysis inducing (Hammond et al., 1987). What we see is the ​experts signalling adapting to this                
particular condition, portraying a flexibility in their decision-making. These results support the            
findings by Gustafsson (2004), who states that ​experts are more adaptive with their decision              
behaviour. Our findings extend beyond just this scenario, but in fact to all the scenarios. Looking                
at all the scenarios of this study, the ​experts display a much larger variation in their usage of ​AN                   
and ​NA strategies from scenario to scenario. The ​novices’ ​percentages stay far more constant.              
(See Appendix 7.5) ​This occurrence falls in line with Shanteau (1992) stating that novices seek               
out much more information, when compared to experienced individuals.. ​Novices portrayed           
behaviour fitting by Gustafsson (2004) who asserts that novices adhere to analysis regardless of              
the task in the opportunity-recognition phase. Our findings suggest that this claim can be              
extended to this pricing scenario. As the scenarios progress, ​novices who have been in business               
for less than a year, will more and more be lacking experience in the particular stage of business.                  
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One would expect more and more dependency on the information provided, while the ​experts              
continue to be able to draw from experience, enabling them to diverge from analytic behaviour.               
Our results contradict statements by Einhorn (1974), who claims that expert behaviour leads to              
similar judgement and consensus regarding tasks. Their findings suggest that expertise causes            
decisions to align. The noticeable difference in the min:max usage of both ​NA and ​AN of the                 
expert​s suggests a lack of consensus in this scenario. This may reflect the openness of the                
problem, which can be argued through statements of the ​novices​, which frequently point to              
insufficient data.  
 
Novices claimed insufficient data five times, while ​experts took to ​NA strategies and portrayed              
seven instances of making creative solutions. This comparison highlights certain competencies           
that the ​experts reflected, being able to provide novel solutions in uncertain conditions. This, in               
conjunction with the prevalence of heuristics and usage of rules of thumb by the experts, reflects                
findings that fall in line with statements from Cohen and Levinthal (1990) regarding experts’              
superior ability to transfer knowledge from experience onto new problems. 
 
In our findings, it is worth highlighting perhaps the most notable difference between the experts               
and the novices. The novices, who are at the beginning of their career and development, may not                 
have reached the stage of possessing, or displaying, this type of entrepreneurial behaviour. Upon              
comparing the findings it can be stated, that the experts act in accordance with what is deemed to                  
be entrepreneurial, whereas the novices did not. The underlying result of the pricing scenario              
continues to be that ​experts make more use of ​NA decision strategies. The strong adherence to                
AN behaviour by the ​novices is further reflected in the fact that the top three strategies were                 
analytic and focused on the data, both by stating insufficient data but also repeatedly using the                
data as guidance throughout the verbalisation. This continuous following of data, or cues, falls              
very much in line with statements by Anderson (1988), who state that novices will actively seek                
out information and even follow the specific order in which these cues are presented. This               
displays strict ​AN behaviour. Andersson’s findings seem to hold true for our findings in this               
scenario. What further supports this, is that three out of the four ​novices made changes to their                 
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previous decision, based on new information being made available. None of the ​experts altered              
their original responses. Epstein et al. (1996) make the case that, upon reception of new               
information, analytic behaviour is more likely to create deviation from an original decision. This              
suggests that the novices acted in a more ​AN fashion. This behaviour is clearly prevalent for the                 
novices in this scenario, and acts as support for claims by Gustafsson (2004) that novices show                
more analytical behaviour. While her results focused on the opportunity-recognition phase, our            
results suggest these claims can be extended further, to this pricing scenario. 
 
4.3 Marketing Scenario  
In this third scenario we asked participants to pick a market strategy given some price               
estimations. The entrepreneurs were also asked if they had other preferred solutions which they              
would rather choose, and why. 
 
Novices​: 
In total, ​AN strategies took an upper hand again with ​NA ​instances being the lowest of all                 
scenarios. ​Novices ​maintained a focus on data and utilised them to aid in decision-making.              
Statements like ​“interested because..this option is relatively cheap in comparison to that one” ​recorded              
instances of focus on data, and the following statement from Anabel corresponds to a formal               
systematic method 
 
“I would like to do a SWOT analysis..based on the information and some assumptions” 
 
As for ​NA ​decisions, ​novices ​displayed the highest usage of rules of thumb, followed by other                
heuristics. A prime example of a rule was recorded as follows: 
 
 “...been told that I want to spend something like 20% of revenue on marketing” 
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Other common cues that also signalled rules of thumb include ​“start small and think big” ​and ​“sell                 
as much as possible and keep costs down”  
 
Experts: 
NA reasoning was heavily preferred by the ​experts especially with the use of heuristics. Going               
through the case, Miro put a lot of thought into picking his marketing channel and settled on                 
internet as his choice. He based his decision on generalities and knowledge acquired, which we               
categorised as other heuristics. Eg: ​“I’ve read a lot you know about companies that have been very                 
successful in doing internet marketing and if you do it right, it’s a lot cheaper”​. ​Another form of                  
heuristics detected was representativeness which we coded for instances showing tendencies of            
generalisations. For example, Miro likens the internet to a ​“water drop effect”​. He concluded by               
providing a novel solution that was not part of the problem set. 
 
“Why just go to schools, we could do direct selling to stores and online stores and stuff. You 
know go to Amazon, get this software in there” 
 
Other participants used more of ​AN ​approach to tackle this question. For example, Finn used               
logical deductions to justify his decision of picking the direct selling option.​“I can approach them               
and tell them with entrepreneurship you have an alternative form of employment”​. Another ​expert,              
Fiona​, ​was quick to use a systemic approach of divide & conquer to eliminate an option. 
 
“I don’t want to go through the route of training people, so I will eliminate this immediately” 
 
Marketing Scenario Analysis:  
Novices showed strong ​AN decision-making in this scenario once again. This follows suggestions             
by Cooper et al. (1995) that novices will follow information more vigorously under uncertain              
circumstances, compared to experienced entrepreneurs. As the scenarios progress further to tasks            
that are new to the ​novices​, we expect this to be more noticeable. What is seen in our results is                    
that ​experts maintained a very ​NA ​approach relative to the ​novices​. The mean responses from the                
two groups of entrepreneurs furthermore indicate their tendencies regarding the use of ​NA ​and              
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AN ​decision-making under the conditions of this scenario. The ​novice results once again fall in               
line with Gustafsson’s (2004) findings that novices remain analytic in various tasks throughout             
the opportunity-recognition phase. Our results indicate that these claims can be extended. As             
Baron and Ensley (2006) remark, the difference in life experiences impacts the use of heuristics,               
as can be interpreted from the ​NA ​tendencies of the ​experts​, who have had far more years of                  
learning in the field. Marketing is an important concern and the ​experts have inevitably worked               
with this aspect multiple times before, making it possible to take a more ​NA ​approach in this                 
scenario. What ought to be highlighted here, is the min:max usage of ​AN ​and ​NA ​strategies of the                  
experts​. It can be interpreted that scenario three shows consensus among the participants, which              
Einhorn (1974) proposes to be the case. Interestingly, it will be shown that only in scenario one                 
and three this is reflected in our data. The cause for this, as previously mentioned, could be the                  
openness of our problem statements, despite both groups not mentioning a lack of data. One may                
infer that it could come as a result of this scenario being heavily dependent on personal feelings                 
and convictions. The high ​NA count for the ​experts reflects behaviour researched by Cooper et               
al. (1995), stating that experience leads to less focus on finding information. 
 
This scenario also saw high usage of representativeness heuristic from ​experts in the form of               
generalisations and associations. Results from Busenitz & Barney (1997) showed entrepreneurs’           
tendency to use representativeness to a much larger degree compared to managers in large              
organisations. The ​experts in this study appeared to behave in a similar fashion as suggested in                
this scenario.  
4.4 Termination Scenario 
In this fourth scenario a long time employee is going through personal issues which has               
decreased the person's productivity levels over the last half of the year. Participants were asked               
to choose between letting the person go or keeping the employee as part of the workforce.  
 
Novices: 
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Despite the dilemmatic nature of this scenario, ​novices kept a keen eye on the data provided but                 
also took inspiration from outside sources. Instances of recorded ​NA ​behaviour tended to             
originate in the form of emotions or feelings. These were recorded as emotional choice, affect               
infusion and affect heuristics. Appeal to a higher order of emotions and the role of affect was                 
clear with such statements coded as emotional choice: 
 
“We support each other in hard times, because the mentality of everyone is crucial” 
 
Novices also recorded a number decisions based on inclinations without real deliberation.            
Statements such as ​“I find these situations..” and ​“I don’t want to”​, were recorded as affect                
heuristics in the relevant cases. Another ​novice references mood and highlights the weight it              
carries in such situations which we marked as affect infusion.​“​...sometimes it can really depend on               
how I’m feeling you know. If I had an accident in the morning and somebody poured coffee on me, firing                    
him will be a lot easier..” 
 
In terms of ​AN behaviour, ​novices reasoned using available information. Focussing on the data              
present with statements such as ​“ultimately if the performance is not right..cannot be having that” ​and                
“it is not about being nice or mean, we need to run a business”​. This led to logical deductions like                    
“There is a problem..I try to help it, and it does not work.....so the solution is to fire”​. ​Other instances                    
demonstrated that ​novices had an understanding of formal systematic methods that can be             
utilised in such scenarios. Anabel made that clear with the following statement: 
 
“A company has many options to affect people in these situation. Implement a monitoring system,               
improve communications channels, schemas and rotas” 
 
Experts: 
Experts ​were again high in ​NA usage, with emotions playing a crucial role in their decisions.                
However, that is not to say the focus on data was withdrawn which could be seen with statements                  
such as ​“I don’t want to let him go, but it seems I have tried to boost his productivity levels”​. To others,                      
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it was a matter of empathy and so the data itself played a limited role in convincing otherwise.                  
Eg: ​“I have seen this myself with friends and so I will have some patience”  
 
Some instances showed ​experts not satisfied with the information provided thereby taking            
alternate paths recorded as creative solutions : ​“..maybe help him get another job and not leave him                 
on the street, since he was loyal from the beginning”​. ​Another ​expert​, Finn, displayed elements of                
regret from a similar situation in the past which was coded as counterfactual thinking. 
 
“In another company I was involved in, we had the wrong person running the company. It ended up 
costing the company lots and lots of money. Looking back, the person had psychopathic tendencies and 
we should have seen that”  
 
He concluded by saying, ​“it’s not always easy, especially here in Sweden but if you are logical you                  
have to let him go and have him com​e back later maybe”​. Although, ​AN reasoning was not very                  
popular in this scenario, one ​expert ​took to the use of logical deductions to make this decision.                 
“​Underperforming..let him go, to gain happiness. Come back and things would be back to normal” 
 
Termination Scenario Analysis: 
This scenario contained the least amount of objective measures and due to the openness of the                
question, and limit of information, was expected to induce ​NA reasoning from the participants. In               
this scenario ​experts demonstrated the second largest use of ​NA ​usage among all their scenarios               
at 71% while the ​novices showed a slight increase in ​NA ​usage from the previous scenario. In                 
general, ​novices did not have a significantly higher proportion of ​NA ​reasoning in this scenario               
compared to others. The ​novices show a predominant use of ​AN strategies, continuing this rather               
constant adherence throughout all the scenarios. The event of firing people may be very              
unfamiliar territory, and could lead to less understanding of the picture as a whole. This could be                 
the reason for these results, with ​novices showing much more exploring of the available              
information to arrive at a decision. Through this they display the analytic behaviour which              
Gustafsson (2004) describes regarding the opportunity-recognition phase. A further statement          
derived from her work is that ​experts indicate more heuristics in the opportunity-recognition             
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phase. This certainly holds true even in this termination scenario, as well as throughout the               
entirety of our results. Our findings show various heuristics that were used, as well as instances                
of counterfactual thinking. These together allow for some speculation regarding how these            
experts can deviate from the data at hand. Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) find that experts are able                 
to envisage outcomes more clearly, due to experience, and our results seem to fall in line with                 
this argument. The use of heuristics, and frequent discussion of the past, was indicated by the                
experts​ as being central to answering this question. 
 
This scenario once again did not show the expected consensus among the ​experts’ answers, as               
proposed by Einhorn (1974). Our results suggest that the usage of ​NA ​differed rather drastically               
(seen in the min:max value for ​NA)​, between just this small sample of entrepreneurs. This               
scenario cannot be stated to display decision-making behaviour that is measurably similar            
between the sample of ​experts​. What this however does, is highlight the strength of the cognitive                
approach to studying entrepreneurial decision-making. As addressed by Mitchell et al. (2007), a             
strength of a cognitive approach to studying decision-making exists due of the heterogeneity of              
entrepreneurs, rendering the more traditional trait approach less suited for this cause. Our results              
from the ​experts support the assumption of this heterogeneity, given that in our small set of                
expert entrepreneurs a rather strong difference in approaches is noticeable. 
 
With regards to specific differences in strategies used, logical deductions appeared seven times             
for ​novices and only once for ​experts​. Likewise, other heuristics was counted five times for               
experts and none for ​novices​. This could suggest that ​experts are hesitant to rely on the data in                  
such situations and instead draw from personal experiences. ​Novices however continue with            
adhering to the data provided, displaying ​AN behaviour. The cause may be the lack of available                
information, and a lack of experience in this environment for the ​novices​. Nevertheless, the              
experts divergence from data can be argued to show better ability to determine relevancy of               
information, as stated by authors such as Shanteau (1992). Another interesting result is the              
appearance of emotional reasoning in this scenario. ​Experts ​and ​novices ​recorded very high             
instances of emotional choice and affect infusion. This finding is in line with Brundin &               
42 
Gustafsson’s (2013) agreement on the role of emotion in entrepreneurial decision-making, but            
specific to the termination scenario. Looking further into the decisions themselves, the results             
showed ​experts ​to be much more reluctant to fire the employee despite the data provided. Wong                
et al., (2013) infer that entrepreneurs look to avoid negative emotions and the ​experts ​can be                
argued to confirm to this behaviour.  
 
A noticeable difference between the ​experts and the ​novices is the use of ​AN strategies in this                 
scenario. ​Experts indicate little importance to ​AN strategies and this difference is made more              
significant by a comparison to the pricing scenario, the most analytic-inducing scenario in this              
study. ​Experts display much stronger abandonment of ​AN behaviour than ​novices​, in a scenario              
that leaves more room for subjective and emotional reasoning. As Gustafsson (2004) states,             
experts show better ability of adapting their decision-making styles.  
4.5 Exit Scenario 
In this scenario the participants were asked to decide on a future course for their company.                
Participants could decide between going public, selling the company and continue without any             
outside influence. The question provided some numbers and information regarding each option. 
 
Novices​: 
Novices responses were mixed in this scenario but again ​AN reasoning played a bigger role than                
external influences (​NA​). ​Novices​ analysed the data intently and made conclusions from them. 
Responses that showed this behaviour include simple statements such as ​“the information here to              
me says to pick..” and “...big topic..need to look at these [options] a bit” to more complex statements                  
such as the following deduction. 
 
“..I sell my company to Disney, this means I will be out of a job, I don’t know how much money I 
will actually get, and someone else will do things to what I created” 
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Another ​AN ​category with many recorded instances was pointing to insufficient data suggesting             
a difficult question for the ​novices​. An example being, Anabel’s statement: ​“I would need more               
[information] to make a decision that I’d call my right decision”​.  
 
Still, some ​novices ​showed previous learnings and utilised ​NA ​reasoning citing regret and             
emotions. Counterfactual thinking was recorded in three separate occasions. Enrico made the            
connection of past anguish to avoid making a future mistake.  
 
“[reached what was] ultimately a disadvantage, by getting out of a stable job in favour of                
something new...cost me many things and I wished I had done the exact opposite of my planning                 
procedure” 
 
The personal nature of the question was also apparent with participants dwelling on wants, likes               
and dislikes. An example being, the following statement which was recorded as affect heuristic.              
“After I have worked on something for 10 years, I want new things, and I want this boring thing to stop” 
 
Experts: 
This scenario saw the largest use of ​NA ​reasoning from ​experts across all scenarios. Categories               
appearing most frequently were affect heuristics, counterfactual thinking, emotional choice and           
rules of thumb.  
An example showing affect heuristic was Fiona pointing to her preferred style of work.​“I like               
collaborations that opens new presence for changing what i’m doing”​. Another ​expert Miro, having              
sold four companies in the past had much to add in this scenario. He used an ​AN ​strategy of                   
divide and conquer to break down the options into pros and cons and eliminated one option                
citing a rule of thumb: ​“IPO is always the last option because all of a sudden you lose control and you                     
go step into a totally different arena”​. He then used various heuristic measures to support this rule,                 
with the following statement adjudged as representativeness. 
 
“You know when Tetra Pak went into Russia they lost money for how many years. Ikea same thing, when 
they do their expansion and they were in the stock market, it would be quite tough I think” 
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 Ultimately, counterfactual thinking and emotional choice were conflicting drivers when making           
the decision. His past experience highlighted the need to ​“secure a baseline” but ​“​When you are                
building a company and put so much energy into it, you have this emotional attachment to it and really                   
want to see it grow”​. ​Thus, his final decision took on a middle ground: 
 
“If this was my first company, I would sell. If this was my second or third I would keep going” 
 
Overall, ​AN ​reasoning in this scenario was quite limited with Harald being the only ​expert ​not                
interested in selling the company. He focussed on the data provided to form logical deductions               
from the available options:​“It says, I’m in the tenth year of growing and since i’m profitable I go with                   
direction 3 (continue with the company)” 
 
Exit Scenario Analysis: 
The split in responses by the ​novices in this exit scenario shows predominantly ​AN strategies,               
with 61% of the cues being categorised as such. The figures for the mean responses show that as                  
a group, the tendency for ​novices to primarily rely on analysis is consistent and strong.               
Gustafsson’s (2004) results, which focus on the opportunity-recognition phase, can be seen to             
hold true for a firm exit phase in our data. This reflects an extension of existent literature                 
regarding this analytic behaviour of ​novices​. What can be understood from the ​novices behaviour              
in this scenario, as well as the opportunity-recognition phase discussed by Gustafsson, is that the               
uncertainty of the problem promotes ​AN behaviour among ​novices​. These findings seem to             
correspond to the findings by Cooper et al. (1995) which show that in uncertainty ​novices ​seek                
out more information, compared to experienced entrepreneurs. The specific uncertainty from this            
exit scenario may originate from the newness of the problem, given that the ​novices had been in                 
business less than one year, and therefore had no experience with this phase of a business.                
Experts show a considerable increase in ​NA usage in this scenario, given that it left much room                 
for personal input. The increase from the previous scenario, in the mean ​NA value, can be argued                 
to reflect that ​experts are more ready to change their particular decision-making style. What can               
be seen is that the ​experts did not reflect consensus, when comparing the individual with the least                 
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NA and the individual with the most ​NA usage. This does not correspond to the propositions by                 
Einhorn (1974), which argue that ​expertise would lead to similar decisions. The min:max usage              
of ​AN and ​NA strategies showed a strong difference between what type of behaviour the ​experts                
displayed. In comparison, the min:max value shows a much more consistent ​AN approach of the               
novices​. Once again the openness of the question may be the reason for this, leaving much                
freedom to address this question outside of our intended scope. For the ​experts this allowed for a                 
more heuristic and ​NA​ approach, as can be seen in their top used strategies for this scenario. 
 
A striking difference between the choices of strategies is the use of affect heuristics. Inevitably               
experts will have more experience with the exit process of an entrepreneur and have had the                
chance to develop thoughts and opinion. Many responses came in the form of opinions without               
much reasoning about these, which leads to questioning how in this scenario the ​experts              
reasoned internally. This final scenario appears to be the one with the most affect heuristics used,                
despite no apparent reason for this. The ​experts’ experience with exits may be the reason for this,                 
given that it is an infrequent event. This allows questioning whether under certain circumstances,              
experts will draw from reasoning which is very little motivated, leaving perhaps much room for               
error. While in other scenarios, it can be stated that ​experts draw from personal experience and                
thus display certain heuristics, the use of affect heuristics did not occur as strongly as in this final                  
scenario. Studying this decision behaviour on a cognitive level may be a strong tool for               
understanding phenomenons such as in this scenario. ​Novices​, the more ​analytic ​group,            
displayed affect heuristics only two times which strengthens the statement that ​novices will look              
for more information, especially under uncertain circumstances (Cooper et al. 1995). The            
novices’ adherence to data in this scenario is rather clear and typical compared to the other                
scenario, which furthermore raises the question of what about this scenario has lead to the               
experts’​ use of affect heuristics.  
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4.6 Discussion 
Do heuristics presuppose experience in a task? 
The theme of heuristics is a central component throughout this paper, due to its prevalence in the                 
data and importance to the category of non-analytic behaviour. The responses from both the              
experts ​and the ​novices indicate its presence like literature suggests. A noticeable difference             
became apparent throughout this study, especially when moving from scenarios that could be             
familiar to a young startup to ones where a young entrepreneur most likely had no experience.  
 
Experts ​were consistently far more heuristic, portraying much more ​NA behaviour,           
corresponding to findings by Gustafsson (2004), which primarily focused on the           
opportunity-recognition phase. A striking difference was seen in ​how heuristics were utilised.            
Despite the limited scope of ​how these two groups differed in the usage of heuristics, some                
conjecture can be made around this general ​NA behaviour. The openness of many scenarios              
enabled participants to address the problems with much freedom. This freedom seems to have              
been exploited to a greater extent by the ​experts​. This realisation does not come from the                
instances where ​experts used their specific knowledge of having dealt with a specific problem              
before, but much more from the instances where experts drew from a wide background of               
material in order to aid in one specific component of the problem. ​Novices appeared to address                
only the surface of problems, which is stated to be a significant difference to expert behaviour                
(Mitchell & Chesteen, 1995). Despite ​experts showing that they draw from problem related             
experiences through relevant cognitive frameworks or expert scripts (Baron, 2006; Mitchell &            
Chesteen 1995), much of the ​NA behaviour came from experience outside the field of              
entrepreneurship. The essence of this comparison revolves around the fact that heuristics can             
draw from a wide area of experience, and in this context, allows the statement to be made that                  
entrepreneurs do not solely rely on their entrepreneurial experience. This however, can not be              
interpreted into our data of the ​novices​. Considering that entrepreneurs act in an unusually              
uncertain environment, and heuristics are a crucial tool for navigating this landscape (Ucbasaran             
et al., 2015), it appears the ​novices​’ avoidance of ​NA behaviour could be seen as a disadvantage.                 
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One apparent reason for classifying ​experts ​to be more ​NA comes due to their use of experience                 
from a broad and holistic context, not just the entrepreneurial one. 
 
Are novices ‘entrepreneurial’ ? 
The ​novices in our study were required to hold less than one-year of business experience to                
create the largest difference in expertise among the two groups. The findings showed these              
entrepreneurs to be significantly less ​NA inclined, either by choice or limited experience.             
Consequently, this translated to lower usage of most heuristics measures. One particular strategy             
that ​novices utilised in much smaller proportion to ​experts is representativeness heuristic.            
Busenitz & Barney (1997) demonstrated entrepreneurs’ overwhelming usage of         
representativeness, or the propensity to generalise compared to middle-managers in large           
business organisations. An interesting question can thus be posed against the entrepreneurs in our              
study with less than one year of business experience. Have they really attained an entrepreneurial               
mindset? Is there a transition from a student mindset to one of an entrepreneur after a few years                  
of experience in the field? One can argue that school work does not necessarily facilitate the use                 
of heuristics and the real world is very different scenario for which one-year is not a sufficient                 
transition period. 
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5. Conclusions  
 
We intended to answer our research question with respect to the usage of analytic and               
non-analytic decision-making among expert entrepreneurs and novice entrepreneurs across         
various entrepreneurial scenarios. Gustafsson (2004) took a similar approach in the           
opportunity-recognition phase and found novices to be analytically inclined irrespective of the            
demands of the task and experts much more flexible in their reasoning. Our findings corroborate               
her results to a large extent. From our small sample of participants, across all five scenarios, the                 
novices were overwhelmingly in favour of ​AN ​reasoning and conversely, ​experts ​tended to use              
NA ​reasoning. However, the ​experts showed much more variability in their approach; the pricing              
scenario being an example where they displayed much higher ​AN ​reasoning in relation to other               
scenarios. Thus, in a broader sense, it can be argued that ​novices and ​experts ​use different                
decision-making scripts not just in recognising opportunity but also at different stages of the              
entrepreneurial journey.  
 
Examining the particular strategies used by both subgroups of entrepreneurs also yielded            
interesting outcomes. While both ​novices ​and ​experts ​appeared to show varied decision-making,            
with respect to ​AN ​and ​NA ​behaviour, it was fascinating to see how different they were with                 
regards to the particular strategies used. ​Novices ​for example when using ​AN ​reasoning,             
preferred to focus on the data presented to make logical deductions. However, the ​experts when               
being analytic, still maintained a focus on data, but tended to seek formal systematic methods to                
analyse this data. These were seen in the form of computations, ROI calculations, SWOT              
analysis, decision-tree analysis etc. The ​novices were also vigorous to seek out information when              
progressing through scenarios, possibly highlighting their unfamiliarity with later stage          
entrepreneurial tasks due to limited business experience (Cooper et al., 1995).  
 
In the realm of non-analytic decisions as well there were considerable differences particularly in              
the specific usage of various heuristic strategies. ​Novices ​had a tendency to use affect heuristics               
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moreseo than other means. These correspond to decisions that were made with a feeling of ‘like’                
or ‘dislike’ and little deliberate reasoning (Kahneman, 2011). Conversely, when ​experts made            
use of external influences for their decisions, it materialised in the form of rules of thumb and                 
representativeness heuristic. Rules of thumb can be understood as a set of predefined rules that               
these entrepreneurs use to make sense of their environment (Simon & Houghton, 2002) and              
representativeness as making generalisations and associations based on just a few details            
(Busenitz, 1999). ​Experts ​were also much more likely to make use of narratives as a heuristic                
means to give novel, creative solutions. This is in agreement with suggested characteristics of              
expert decision-makers (Shanteau, 1988). Furthermore, ​experts ​and ​novices ​also differ in           
information extraction as our small sample showed all ​experts ​‘ignoring the fluff’ compared to              
just one ​novice​, supporting the idea that expert entrepreneurs are able to identify relevant              
information quickly (Mitchell & Chesteen, 1995).  
 
With regards to the use of emotions, both groups of entrepreneurs showed elements of emotional               
decision-making, particularly in the termination and exit scenario. ​Experts however, showed           
their likeliness to pursue counterfactual thinking which is learning from regret or ‘what if’              
scenarios to address a future situation. Nonetheless, both groups of entrepreneurs showed their             
affinity to be swayed by the role of affect/feelings further cementing the idea that entrepreneurs               
are not ‘rational computers’ (Brundin & Gustafsson, 2013). 
 
Our findings show one discrepancy with regards to previous literature which discusses that             
expertise leads to consensus in decisions (Einhorn, 1974). This proposition does not hold true, as               
in various scenarios the ​experts showed distinctly different approaches to tackling the problem.             
In most of our scenarios, an apparent difference can be seen in the amount of ​AN and ​NA usage                   
of the individual ​experts​. What is concluded from this realisation is that there seems to be an                 
apparent heterogeneity among even the small sample size of ​experts​, which we take to argue that                
the ‘trait’ approach does not capture the complexities of entrepreneurs appropriately.           
Subsequently we find this to support statements that the cognitive approach may be an applicable               
mode of exploring decision-making (Mitchell et al., 2007; Ucbasaran et al., 2015). As             
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highlighted in the later scenarios, we find no apparent explanation for the ​experts’ behaviour,              
which we conclude is best addressed in further cognitive research into decision-making. 
 
5.1 Implications for Research and Practice 
 
In breaking down analytic and non-analytic decisions, we have attempted to provide further             
insight into entrepreneurial cognition and also address a need outlined by Shepherd et al. (2015)               
which is the detailing of various types of heuristics used by entrepreneurs. Gustafsson (2004)              
also highlight the need for novice entrepreneurs to learn heuristics and how to use them. This                
paper has taken baby steps in that path detailing various strategies, heuristics and others. Using               
our findings, novice entrepreneurs can gain a better understanding of how they are different from               
expert entrepreneurs. This knowledge can be a valuable tool for the novices as Mitchell &               
Chesteen (1995) mentions interacting with experts or expert scripts creates ideal circumstances            
to gain expertise.  
 
It is important to keep in mind the small sample size of this research paper and thus forming                  
definite conclusion would require a study addressing a much larger sample in a similar fashion.               
The results from this study can be viewed as a promising start providing descriptive value of the                 
various cognitive strategies employed by entrepreneurs. Future studies can join this type of             
research with a normative approach to create best-practice guidelines. As Gustafsson (2004)            
pointed out, this should emerge from evaluating success of these strategies. Undoubtedly, it             
would provide ​novices ​with ​stronger support in understanding how to approach entrepreneurial            
tasks.  
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7. Appendix 
7.1  Case 
Intro:  
For this experiment, imagine you are an entrepreneur who has built an imaginary product. 
Although the product is imaginary, it is technically feasible and financially viable. You are trying 
to build a company and take this product to the market using little money of your own and 
whatever experience you have till date. Please answer the following questions relating to 
different scenarios of the company’s life-cycle. The case data has been obtained through realistic 
market research - the kind of research used in developing a real world business plan.  
 
The Product 
The product is a game that consists of a simulated environment for starting and running a 
company. The game has a sophisticated multi-media interface — for example, a 3D office where 
phones ring with messages from the market, a TV that will provide macroeconomic information 
etc.. During the game, the player has to make production decisions such as how much to 
produce, whether to build new warehouses or negotiate with trucking companies, etc. Based on 
these decisions, the player receives feedback on their performance.  
 
ANSWERING STYLE  
The style of this experiment is not conversational, instead you are meant to think aloud the 
thoughts you are having (you can ignore we are sitting here). Ideally, we would like you to 
verbalise all your thoughts including what you have read. ​PLEASE EXPAND ​on your decisions 
and reasoning as much as possible. Moreover, try to explain what sources of information you 
draw from in order to give your answers.  Much of the questions are given limited information 
and intentionally left vague because the decisions themselves are not as interesting as the process 
of arriving at those decisions.  
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 PRACTICE EXAMPLES 
1) Complete this simple math task:   64 + 26 = 
 
2) Today is Wednesday and you need to buy a birthday present for your friend’s birthday 
that takes place on Friday. When will you go buy the  present?  
 
1) ENTRY SCENARIO 
Look at the available information, and make a decision about the following: 
 
 
● The estimated value of the instructional technology market is SEK 17 billion 
● The estimated value of the interactive simulation game market is SEK 8 billion 
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● Both are expected to grow at a minimum rate of 20% p.a. For the next 5 years.
 
A) Which customer segment will you target and why? 
B) What market will you target with your product and why? 
 
2) PRICING SCENARIO 
You do customer research through online questionnaires and also in person at 2 bookstores. 
Based on your findings, answer the questions below: 
 
Internet Research: 
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In-person Research at Bookstores 
 
A) How will you price your product, and why? 
B) Who is the primary target of your product now, and why? 
 
3) MARKETING SCENARIO 
Based on your market research, you arrive at the following cost estimates for marketing your 
product. 
Internet  SEK 200 000 up front + SEK 5000 per month thereafter 
Retailers  SEK 5 million to SEK 10 million up front and support services and follow-up thereafter 
Mail Order 
Catalogs  Relatively Cheap - but ads and demos could cost SEK 500 000 up front 
Direct Selling to 
Schools  Involves recruiting and training sales representatives 
 
A) What option do you chose, and why?  
B) Are there other options you would prefer, and why? 
 
4) TERMINATION SCENARIO 
One of your highest paid employees who has been at the company from it’s early days just got 
divorced. In the last 6 months this person’s productivity levels have dropped significantly and a 
lot of key activities are not being performed. Your attempts to help recover and boost 
productivity have been futile. You deliberate firing this person because of the effect on 
co-workers and product quality. However, this person has served the firm since the beginning 
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and this slump could be a temporary phenomenon but there is no way to tell. Would you let go of 
this employee? Motivate your decision. 
 
5) EXIT SCENARIO 
 The company is now in its 10th year growing and people are starting to take notice. You 
have acquired three other profitable product lines. You're doing SEK 700 million in sales and 
project  you will reach SEK 1 billion within a year. At this point, you have three possible 
directions. 
 
Direction 1: 
Your accountants and bankers think this is a good time for you to take the company 
public. The IPO market is booming and the industry you’re in is seeing upward trend. They 
estimate you should make an IPO of 2 million shares at SEK 300 per share. The company has a 
total of 12 million shares outstanding.  
 
Direction 2 
At this point in time, ​Disney​ approaches you and makes an offer for your company - it 
seems they have decided to get in on the booming educational software market and have decided 
to enter the arena through acquisitions  -They see you as a perfect fit for their strategy and offer 
you SEK 4.2 billion. 
 
Direction 3 
You want to maintain majority of the control within your firm and think you can take this 
company forward without giving up equity. You decide to reject both offers for now. 
 
A) Which of these directions do you choose and why? 
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7.2  Coding Scheme 
 
● Age 
● Years working as an entrepreneur 
● Country of operation 
● How many ventures started, as a main decision-maker 
● Number and type of industry 
● Level of education 
 
 
Question 1: Entry Scenario 
A) Which customer segment will you target and why? ​Check for adherence to the numbers. 
Code: Reference to outside information in order to arrive at an answer 
  
1) Number, and type, of references to non-analytic motivators in this scenario 
2) Number, and type, of references to analytic motivators in this scenario 
 
 
B) What market will you target with your product and why? 
 
Code:  
1) Did the subject state the diagram was unnecessary? Yes or No 
2) Time spent​ ​discussing the diagram: 
3) Words used to describe the diagram: 
4) Number, and type, of references to non-analytic motivators in this scenario 
5) Number, and type, of references to analytic motivators in this scenario 
 
 
2) Pricing Scenario 
A) How will you price your product, and why? 
B) Who is the primary target of your product now, and why? 
 
1) Number, and type, of references to outside information 
2) Number, and type, of ​references to provided information from problem 
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3) Number of outcomes imagined per potential decision: 
4) Did the participant change their mind given the new information? Yes or No 
 
3) MARKETING SCENARIO 
A) What option do you chose, and why?  
 
1) Is an option from the available choices chosen? 
2) Is the answer dependent on the numbers? 
3) Number, and type, of references to non-analytic motivators in this scenario 
4) Number, and type, of references to analytic motivators in this scenario 
 
B) Are there other options you would prefer, and why? 
 
 
1) Number of outside options proposed as alternative instead of options in the question: 
2) Origins of proposed options: 
 
 
4) TERMINATION SCENARIO 
1) Number, and type, of references to non-analytic motivators in this scenario: 
2) Number, and type, of references to analytic motivators in this scenario: 
 
5) EXIT SCENARIO 
1) Number, and type, of references to non-analytic motivators in this scenario: 
2) Number, and type, of references to analytic motivators in this scenario: 
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7.3 Table of Codes 
 
 Non-Analytic Codes  
Concept (Origin) Description Quote Examples 
Affect Infusion (Baron, 1998) 
 
References to the role of 
affect in the decision 
making process 
...sometimes it can really 
depend on how I’m feeling 
you know. If I had an 
accident in the morning 
and somebody poured 
coffee on me, firing him 
will be a lot easier.. 
 
“I don’t make a decision in 
one day. My mood will 
change, then I will look at 
it again” 
Other Heuristics  (Fong et al., 1989) 
 
Abstract inferential rules 
that guide thought process. 
 
Includes references to 
personal experiences and 
heuristics that could not be 
categorised under other 
proposed heuristics 
categories 
..when you go public, you 
can’t take decisions like 
yeah okay let’s try 
this...because your net 
profit would drop. 
 
“I’ve read a lot you know 
about companies that have 
been very successful in 
doing internet marketing 
and if you do it right, it’s a 
lot cheaper” 
Representativeness 
Heuristics 
(Busenitz, 1997) 
 
Making generalisations on 
individuals or topics based 
on only a few details about 
them  
“..because this game is not 
something like sonic or 
candy crush..” 
 
“Younger adults..have 
more energy and a better 
chance of starting a 
business because no 
commitments like family 
and debts” 
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Affect heuristic (Kahneman, 2011) 
 
Making judgements 
directly by feelings of 
liking and disliking, with 
little deliberation or 
reasoning.  
“..I like these types of 
games and I think I would 
have used it when I was 
that age” 
 
“I have a good feeling 
about this one” 
 
“After I have worked on 
something for 10 years, I 
want new things, and I 
want this boring thing to 
stop” 
Counterfactual Thinking (Baron, 2004; ) 
 
Using past regret or ‘if 
only’, ‘what if’ scenarios as 
a baseline to make a future 
decision  
“Looking back, I would not 
have sold my first 
company so I don’t think I 
will sell this one” 
Emotional Choice 
 
 
 
Cardon et al. (2012) 
 
Decisions influenced by the 
role of affect, emotions or 
feelings  
“I would try to be patient      
with him” 
 
 
“[These actions] set the 
base for the working 
environment and the 
ethics of how you are as a 
company” 
 
 
Rule of Thumb (Simon & Houghton, 
2002) 
 
Pre-defined set of rules 
used to understand their 
environment. 
“...been told that I want to 
spend something like 20% 
of revenue on marketing.” 
 
“One thing you shouldn’t 
have is the special 
connection, like it’s your 
baby or something” 
 
People are more 
important, especially if she 
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was here since the 
beginning 
 
Ignore The Fluff Shanteau (1988) 
 
Being able to see 
information that is 
relevant and ignore those 
that are irrelevant.  
 
 
“This information is more 
or less useless” 
Story Telling Hutton & Klein (1999) 
 
Mental simulation 
providing narration to 
explain past experiences 
“If my main focus is to be 
put towards adults, I 
would also have to figure 
out the meaning of what 
educators to address, 
which would take up a lot 
of time, and I really don’t 
know anyone for that” 
Creative Solutions Hutton & Klein (1999) 
Shanteau(1988) 
  
Creative thought or 
narratives leading to novel 
outcomes 
“I would not only promote 
this as a game, but also as 
an instructional product. 
It should be both, 
otherwise it will lose the 
younger audience. But I 
would include the right 
tools into the game and 
then it can be placed in 
both” 
 
“Why just go to schools, 
we could do direct selling 
to stores and online stores 
and stuff. You know go to 
Amazon, get this software 
in there” 
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 Analytic Codes  
Concept (Origin) Description Quotes and Examples 
Insufficient Data (Gustafsson, 2004) 
 
 Stating a lack of 
information or a need for 
more information 
“Need more information”  
 
“More information would 
allow me to..” 
Focus on Data Scepticism about Data, 
close adherence/ 
dependence on data  
 
Decision is based on the 
numbers/information 
provided 
 
 
“This information does not 
really provide and add 
much for me...I would 
instead need…” 
 
“Interested because..this 
option is relatively cheap 
in comparison to that one” 
 
“Ultimately if the 
performance is not right, 
then I cannot be having 
that in my firm..so I would 
let him go” 
 
Formal Systematic 
Methods  
(Hammond et al., 1987)  
 
Use of formalised 
mechanisms/tools/system 
to address a problem, for 
example mathematical, 
financial or strategic 
analysis 
“Considering half the 
population for this 
segment, you can quickly 
calculate a ROI” 
 
“First, I will price it at this 
range, see what happens 
and then create the lighter 
version based on those 
results” 
 
“I would like to do a SWOT 
analysis..based on the 
information and some 
assumptions” 
Changing mind (Epstein et al., 1996)  “Given this, I am inclined 
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 Analytic behaviour more 
likely to change answer 
upon addition of new 
information 
to change my response to 
the previous question” 
Logical Deductions (Gustafson, 2004) 
(Chaiken, 1980) 
 
Logically derived, or 
step-by-step decision from 
information available in 
the problem set 
“Being logical, you have to 
go with the numbers” 
 
“Underperforming..let him 
go, to gain happiness. 
Come back and things 
would be back to normal” 
 
“If I chose this option, I 
will not be able to spend 
time on retailers, who 
could be a second great 
source for this. But money 
is limited, so I would start 
with the strategy I find to 
be most lucrative, and 
then move to the second 
most lucrative one” 
 
“They know what to do, 
then I can move to another 
task and we end up being 
more efficient and 
therefore save money” 
 
“There is a problem..I try 
to help it, and it does not 
work.....so the solution is 
to fire” 
Ballpark Estimation Shanteau (1988) 
 
Create a rough ballpark 
estimate first and then 
conduct a more careful 
analysis. 
 
“I would first pick an 
option from the lower 
category first”  
 
[... after careful analysis] 
 “something in the upper 
end… okay I will price at 
700” 
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Divide & Conquer Shanteau (1988) 
 
Break down problem into 
smaller more manageable 
components before 
attempting to solve them 
 
“I don’t want to go 
through the route of 
training people, so I will 
eliminate this 
immediately” 
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7.4 Result Tables 
Entry Scenario: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pricing Scenario: 
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Marketing Scenario: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Termination Scenario: 
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Exit Scenario: 
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7.5 Answer Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
74 
